---
title: "Interest Rate Risk and Duration in Banks Explained"
description: "How interest rate risk and duration work in banks, why the 2023 failures happened, and how to read a bank's rate exposure from call report and UBPR data"
canonical_url: https://www.bankregreports.com/blog/interest-rate-risk-and-duration/
source: BankRegReports
published: "2026-07-07"
updated: "2026-10-28"
---

At the end of 2022, U.S. banks were sitting on roughly $620 billion in [unrealized losses](/blog/unrealized-losses-on-bank-securities/) on their securities portfolios, the product of buying long-duration bonds when rates were near zero and then watching the Fed raise rates 425 basis points over 2022 (on the way to 525 by July 2023). Most banks survived it. A few did not, and the ones that failed were not undone by bad loans. They were undone by interest rate risk.

That distinction matters. Interest rate risk is not an exotic specialty topic for bank treasury teams. It is the mechanism that turned otherwise healthy balance sheets into ticking problems between 2021 and 2023. Anyone reading bank financials (analysts, investors, examiners, counterparties) needs to understand how it works.

![Unrealized Gains and Losses on Securities - U.S. Banks, Q3 2021 to Q1 2026](figures/interest_rate_risk_and_duration-1.svg)

The losses peaked in the third quarter of 2022, returned to nearly the same level in the third quarter of 2023, and have eased since as portfolios aged, but the question of how to read a bank's exposure from public data did not go away.


<figure>
  <img src="/static/blog/figures/fdic_yield_cost_spread.svg" alt="Asset yields versus funding costs over time" loading="lazy">
  <figcaption>The spread between what banks earn on assets and pay for funding (FDIC).</figcaption>
</figure>

## What Interest Rate Risk Actually Is

Banks engage in maturity transformation. They fund long-dated assets (loans, agency MBS, Treasuries) with shorter-dated liabilities, principally deposits. When rates move, those two sides of the balance sheet respond at different speeds. That lag is where interest rate risk lives.

It shows up in two forms worth distinguishing.

**Repricing (earnings) risk** is the effect of rate changes on net interest income. If a bank's liabilities reprice faster than its assets (deposits ratchet up before the loan book turns over) rising rates compress the margin. You can watch this happen in real time in the UBPR, which reports [net interest margin](/glossary/net-interest-margin/) on a tax-equivalent basis (UBPRE018), or in the call report on Schedule RI: item 1 (interest income), item 2 (interest expense) and net interest income (RIAD4074).

**Price (value) risk** is what happens to the market value of fixed-rate assets when rates move. A 30-year fixed-rate bond bought at par in 2020 is worth considerably less if rates rise 3 points. The call report captures this on Schedule RC-B, which breaks out available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities, with amortized cost and fair value reported side by side: RCON1772 (AFS amortized cost) against RCON1773 (AFS fair value), and RCON1754 (HTM amortized cost) against RCON1771 (HTM fair value). The gap between each pair is the embedded exposure.

Both forms matter. The error is treating them as separate problems rather than two faces of the same structural mismatch.

## Duration: The Number That Tells You How Much

Duration is the sensitivity measure for price risk. Expressed in years, it tells you approximately how much a fixed-income asset's value moves for a 1-percentage-point change in rates.

> Approximate price change ≈ −Duration × Δ rates

A bond with a duration of 6 loses roughly 6% of its value if rates rise 1 point. The same bond gains about 6% if rates fall 1 point. A portfolio of 30-year mortgage-backed securities might carry a duration of 7 to 10 years. A portfolio of 90-day Treasury bills has a duration close to zero.

Duration is not reported directly in public bank filings; the [FFIEC](https://www.ffiec.gov) 031/041/051 call reports do not require it on a portfolio basis. What the call report does provide is the maturity and repricing structure of the securities book on Schedule RC-B, in the Memorandum maturity and repricing buckets: 3 months or less, over 3 months through 12 months, over 1 through 3 years, over 3 through 5 years, over 5 through 15 years, and over 15 years. That bucketing is a duration proxy. A bank whose AFS and HTM securities are heavily weighted toward the over-15-year bucket is carrying long duration. You do not need the exact number to know the exposure is large.

## How a Rate Shock Moves Through a Bank

Walk through a 200-basis-point rate increase at a typical community bank holding a long-duration securities portfolio.

The securities book takes an immediate hit. Fixed-rate MBS and Treasuries fall in price; the longer the duration, the bigger the drop. On the AFS side, those losses flow through accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) and reduce reported equity, visible in RCON3210 on the call report. On the HTM side, the securities are carried at amortized cost, so the unrealized losses never touch AOCI, reported equity or regulatory capital until the securities are sold. Separately, the AOCI opt-out that most non-advanced-approaches banks elected keeps even the AFS losses out of regulatory capital. Losses that sat outside reported capital were the specific problem that surfaced in 2023.

Funding costs start climbing. How fast depends on the bank's [deposit beta](/blog/deposit-beta-and-cost-of-funds/), the fraction of a rate increase that passes through to deposit costs. A beta of 0.40 means a 100 bp Fed hike eventually translates to a 40 bp increase in the bank's cost of deposits. Low-beta banks, typically those with sticky, relationship-driven retail deposits, absorb the rate increase more slowly and protect margin longer. High-beta banks feel it immediately.

Asset yields eventually rise too. New loan originations price off higher market rates, floating-rate loans (tied to prime or SOFR) reprice quickly, and maturing fixed-rate loans roll into new paper at better yields. But "eventually" is doing real work in that sentence. A bank with a large book of 5- to 7-year fixed-rate commercial real estate loans does not see those yields move for years. The gap between when liabilities reprice and when assets reprice is the earnings compression window.

Whether the bank comes out ahead or behind from a rate increase depends on the specifics: asset duration, liability structure, deposit beta, and the mix of fixed versus floating. This is asset-liability management, the ongoing effort to keep those mismatches inside acceptable bounds.

## Why 2023 Went From Risk to Failure

Interest rate risk usually degrades earnings over several quarters. It becomes an acute survival problem only when it collides with funding instability.

The specific sequence in 2023: banks had accumulated large long-duration securities portfolios during the low-rate era, booking substantial unrealized losses after 2022's rate moves. Held to maturity, those securities would eventually repay par. The problem was that several banks simultaneously faced deposit outflows (concentrated, uninsured, and technology-amplified) that forced them to liquidate those depressed securities before maturity. Paper losses became realized losses. Realized losses destroyed capital. Capital destruction triggered more outflows.

The duration and the unrealized losses were the loaded weapon. The funding instability was the trigger.

This is why examiners and serious analysts never look at a bank's rate exposure in isolation. The UBPR and call report data needed to assess this are not segregated into an "IRR section"; the picture requires reading securities structure (Schedule RC-B), unrealized positions (RCON1772 against RCON1773 for AFS, RCON1754 against RCON1771 for HTM), deposit composition (Schedule RC-E), uninsured deposits (RCON5597), and net interest margin together. The combination is the exposure.

## Reading Rate Exposure From Public Data

**One note on prefixes before you pull anything.** The same call report item carries a different prefix depending on which form the bank files. FFIEC 041 and 051 filers report `RCON`, for domestic offices. FFIEC 031 filers report `RCFD` on a consolidated basis, and `RCFN` for foreign offices, so total deposits for an 031 filer is RCON2200 plus RCFN2200 rather than RCON2200 alone. Schedule RC-R Part I (regulatory capital and the capital ratios) moved off `RCON` with the Basel III revisions of 2014 and 2015 and now uses `RCOA` on the 041 and 051 and `RCFA` on the 031; Part II (risk-weighted assets) still reports under `RCON` and `RCFD`. Query a single prefix and you will silently drop a whole population rather than get an error, and for an RCON-only query that population is the largest banks in the country.

Here is what the call report and UBPR actually give you:

**Securities maturity structure.** Schedule RC-B shows the maturity/repricing breakdown of the AFS and HTM portfolios. Weight in the over-5-year buckets is a direct indicator of duration. A bank with 60% of its securities portfolio in the over-15-year bucket is carrying meaningfully different rate risk than one holding mostly short paper.

**Unrealized gains and losses.** The AFS unrealized position is RCON1773 (fair value) minus RCON1772 (amortized cost). The HTM unrealized position is RCON1771 (fair value) minus RCON1754 (amortized cost). Comparing those losses to reported tier 1 capital (RCOA8274 on the 041 and 051, RCFA8274 on the 031) gives you the "what if they had to sell" stress test.

**AFS versus HTM split.** A large HTM bucket is not inherently bad, but it means the reported capital ratio is not reflecting the full impact of rate moves. Pull Schedule RC-B and compare the two buckets explicitly.

**Net interest margin trend.** UBPR tax-equivalent NIM (UBPRE018) across quarters tells you whether repricing risk is already showing up in earnings. A margin that compressed 40–60 bp as rates rose signals a liability-sensitive book.

**Deposit composition.** Schedule RC-E breaks out time deposits, money market, savings, and demand. Brokered deposits (RCON2365, in the Schedule RC-E memoranda) and estimated uninsured deposits (RCON5597, Schedule RC-O Memorandum item 2, reported by banks with $1 billion or more in assets) are the funding stability indicators that turn duration risk into liquidity risk.

The [BankRegReports](https://www.bankregreports.com) platform pulls all of these fields for every U.S. bank (commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions via the NCUA 5300) across more than 25 years of quarterly history, pre-computed and peer-grouped. If you want to see how a specific bank's securities duration proxy changed between 2020 and 2023, or how its unrealized AFS losses compared to peer capital ratios, the data is already structured for that comparison.

![AFS Unrealized Gain or Loss as % of Tier 1 Capital, Q3 2021 to Q1 2026](figures/interest_rate_risk_and_duration-2.svg)

## Frequently Asked Questions

**What is interest rate risk for a bank?**
The danger that changes in market interest rates will hurt a bank's earnings or the value of its assets. It arises because banks fund longer-dated assets with shorter-dated liabilities, so the two sides reprice at different speeds when rates move.

**What is duration?**
A measure of how sensitive a fixed-income asset's value is to interest rate changes, expressed in years. A bond with a duration of 5 falls roughly 5% in value if rates rise 1 percentage point. Longer duration means larger price swings for a given rate move.

**How do rising interest rates affect banks?**
Rising rates reduce the value of fixed-rate securities, increase funding costs, and eventually lift yields on new and floating-rate assets. Whether a bank benefits or suffers depends on its asset-liability structure, the duration of its securities, and its deposit beta.

**Why did interest rate risk cause bank failures in 2023?**
Banks held long-duration securities with large unrealized losses after rates rose. When uninsured depositors withdrew funds rapidly, the banks were forced to sell those depressed securities, turning paper losses into realized losses that destroyed capital. Duration created the exposure; unstable funding triggered it.

**What is the difference between repricing risk and price risk?**
Repricing risk is the effect of rate changes on net interest income when assets and liabilities reprice at different speeds. Price risk is the effect of rate changes on the market value of fixed-rate assets, particularly securities. Both are forms of interest rate risk, and a bank facing both simultaneously is the dangerous case.

**How can I assess a bank's interest rate risk from public data?**
Review the maturity and repricing structure of its securities book on Schedule RC-B, its AFS and HTM unrealized losses relative to tier 1 capital (RCON1773 minus RCON1772, and RCON1771 minus RCON1754, against RCOA8274 or RCFA8274), the AFS/HTM split, deposit composition including uninsured and brokered deposits, and the net interest margin trend over multiple quarters. [BankRegReports](https://www.bankregreports.com) presents these fields for every U.S. bank with peer benchmarks and historical trends.

The field that most analysts skip is the HTM bucket. If it is large and rates have moved, the reported capital ratio is not telling the full story, and that is exactly the number regulators and counterparties are relying on.

---

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data for every U.S. bank and credit union, with peer benchmarks and quarterly history.
[Look up a bank](https://www.bankregreports.com/banks/)

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